Added links to the wiki to replace references to outdated
tex docs.

ASTERISK-27430
Reported by: Corey Farrell

Change-Id: I5007e732b30bc7b63d124c530ae8857c89991209

Follow-up to conversion of README.md.

Change-Id: I17ee7cf25bc027ece844efa2c1dfe613aff1e35b

We should be sending people to secure web URL's where available.
Update README's and docs.

Change-Id: Id5b1e049b0b18b49a784f1254605aefa244ce19a

An admin can configure app_minivm with an externnotify program to be run
when a voicemail is received.  The app_minivm application MinivmNotify
uses ast_safe_system() for this purpose which is vulnerable to command
injection since the Caller-ID name and number values given to externnotify
can come from an external untrusted source.

* Add ast_safe_execvp() function.  This gives modules the ability to run
external commands with greater safety compared to ast_safe_system().
Specifically when some parameters are filled by untrusted sources the new
function does not allow malicious input to break argument encoding.  This
may be of particular concern where CALLERID(name) or CALLERID(num) may be
used as a parameter to a script run by ast_safe_system() which could
potentially allow arbitrary command execution.

* Changed app_minivm.c:run_externnotify() to use the new ast_safe_execvp()
instead of ast_safe_system() to avoid command injection.

* Document code injection potential from untrusted data sources for other
shell commands that are under user control.

ASTERISK-27103

Change-Id: I7552472247a84cde24e1358aaf64af160107aef1

Change-Id: I18b7d75187548a9ed55b4f258d21aaaf29d08874

This patch allows individual dialplan functions to be marked as
'dangerous', to inhibit their execution from external sources.

A 'dangerous' function is one which results in a privilege escalation.
For example, if one were to read the channel variable SHELL(rm -rf /)
Bad Things(TM) could happen; even if the external source has only read
permissions.

Execution from external sources may be enabled by setting
'live_dangerously' to 'yes' in the [options] section of asterisk.conf.
Although doing so is not recommended.

Also, the ABI was changed to something more reasonable, since Asterisk
12 does not yet have a public release.

(closes issue ASTERISK-22905)
Review: http://reviewboard.digium.internal/r/432/
........

Merged revisions 403913 from http://svn.asterisk.org/svn/asterisk/branches/1.8
........

Merged revisions 403917 from http://svn.asterisk.org/svn/asterisk/branches/11
........

Merged revisions 403959 from http://svn.asterisk.org/svn/asterisk/branches/12


git-svn-id: https://origsvn.digium.com/svn/asterisk/trunk@403960 65c4cc65-6c06-0410-ace0-fbb531ad65f3

The AMI Originate action can allow a remote user to specify information that can
be used to execute shell commands on the system hosting Asterisk. This can
result in an unwanted escalation of permissions, as the Originate action, which    
requires the "originate" class authorization, can be used to perform actions
that would typically require the "system" class authorization. Previous attempts
to prevent this permission escalation (AST-2011-006, AST-2012-004) have sought
to do so by inspecting the names of applications and functions passed in with
the Originate action and, if those applications/functions matched a predefined
set of values, rejecting the command if the user lacked the "system" class
authorization. As noted by IBM X-Force Research, the "ExternalIVR"
application is not listed in the predefined set of values. The solution for     
this particular vulnerability is to include the "ExternalIVR" application in the
set of defined applications/functions that require "system" class authorization.             
          
Unfortunately, the approach of inspecting fields in the Originate action against
known applications/functions has a significant flaw. The predefined set of
values can be bypassed by creative use of the Originate action or by certain
dialplan configurations, which is beyond the ability of Asterisk to analyze at
run-time. Attempting to work around these scenarios would result in severely         
restricting the applications or functions and prevent their usage for legitimate
means. As such, any additional security vulnerabilities, where an
application/function that would normally require the "system" class
authorization can be executed by users with the "originate" class authorization,
will not be addressed. Instead, the README-SERIOUSLY.bestpractices.txt file has
been updated to reflect that the AMI Originate action can result in commands
requiring the "system" class authorization to be executed. Proper system
configuration can limit the impact of such scenarios.         
          
(closes issue ASTERISK-20132)
Reported by: Zubair Ashraf of IBM X-Force Research
........

Merged revisions 371998 from http://svn.asterisk.org/svn/asterisk/branches/1.8
........

Merged revisions 371999 from http://svn.asterisk.org/svn/asterisk/branches/10
........

Merged revisions 372000 from http://svn.asterisk.org/svn/asterisk/branches/11


git-svn-id: https://origsvn.digium.com/svn/asterisk/trunk@372001 65c4cc65-6c06-0410-ace0-fbb531ad65f3

https://origsvn.digium.com/svn/asterisk/branches/1.4

........
  r247508 | lmadsen | 2010-02-18 11:53:44 -0500 (Thu, 18 Feb 2010) | 1 line
  
  Add additional link to best practices document per jsmith.
........


git-svn-id: https://origsvn.digium.com/svn/asterisk/trunk@247509 65c4cc65-6c06-0410-ace0-fbb531ad65f3

https://origsvn.digium.com/svn/asterisk/branches/1.4

........
  r247502 | lmadsen | 2010-02-18 11:38:17 -0500 (Thu, 18 Feb 2010) | 10 lines
  
  Add best practices documentation.
  
  (issue #16808)
  Reported by: lmadsen
  
  (issue #16810)
  Reported by: Nick_Lewis
  Tested by: lmadsen
  
  Review: https://reviewboard.asterisk.org/r/507/
........


git-svn-id: https://origsvn.digium.com/svn/asterisk/trunk@247503 65c4cc65-6c06-0410-ace0-fbb531ad65f3